Princeton University Library Catalog
- Author/Artist:
- Chen, David [Browse]
- Format:
- Senior thesis
- Language:
- English
- Advisor(s):
- Widner, Jennifer [Browse]
- Department:
- Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs [Browse]
- Class year:
- 2013
- Description:
- 147 pages
- Restrictions note:
- Walk-in Access. This thesis can only be viewed on computer terminals at the Mudd Manuscript Library.
- Summary note:
- Judicial independence, the ability of judges to exercise meaningful authority free
from the constraints and influences of other powerholders, is universally recognized as a
critical component to consolidated democracies, the rule of law, and economic development.
So far, however, it has eluded many states in Sub-Saharan Africa. This thesis explores the
political and institutional factors that contribute to varying levels of judicial independence in
Sub-Saharan African states.
The widely accepted literature claims that heightened political competition leads to
increases in levels of judicial independence. This thesis argues, however, that the relationship
between political competition and judicial independence depends on the broad institutional
features of a state. In environments where formal political institutions are weak and neopatrimonial
structures strong, heightened political competition actually results in lower
judicial independence.
Focusing primarily on executive-judicial relations in the higher courts, a model
investigating the incentives facing judges and executives is developed. During periods of
heightened political competition, weak institutions and neo-patrimonial politics tip the
balance of incentives in favor of lower judicial independence. The unpredictability of power
struggles in weak institutional settings and the high costs of being displaced from power due
to patronage networks cause executives to adopt short time horizons. As a result, they
become more preoccupied with immediate electoral concerns over long-term institution
building. In this context, independent courts pose a threat to executives seeking electoral
victory, leading executives to manipulate the judiciary in hopes of securing favorable
decisions. Judges, faced with increased threats from the executive, are incentivized to defer
to government interests.
Quantitative analysis using cross-country longitudinal measures of judicial
independence finds that political competition indeed has a significant and negative
relationship with levels of judicial independence across the vast majority of Sub-Saharan
African states.
Case studies of Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Ghana mostly confirm the general argument
of the thesis. In Zimbabwe, a case of weak institutions, increasing opposition strength led to
a dramatic purge of the judiciary in 2000 that crippled a formerly robust legal system. In
Zambia, where formal institutions have been somewhat more entrenched, political
competition led some presidents to interfere in courts. However, international donor
pressures partially constrained interference during later administrations. Lastly, Ghana’s
more robust formal political institutions and strong tradition of stable party competition
provided a favorable environment for the development of judicial independence. Beginning
in 1992, executives generally refrained from interference even during periods of heightened
political competition.
The interaction between the broader institutional environment and political
competition in determining levels of judicial independence suggest that judicial reform
measures must be aware of the larger context in which judges and executives act. If isolated
from other initiatives, judicial reforms in weakly institutionalized states are likely to be
eroded by executives when political competition increases. Ideally, judicial reform should
accompany electoral reform and government capacity-building. Targeting private actors
rather than the government may also be a more promising strategy for improving the
strength of judiciaries in African states.
