Nature's teleological order and God's providence : are they compatible with chance, free will, and evil? / Paul Weingartner.

Author
Weingartner, Paul [Browse]
Format
Book
Language
English
Published/​Created
Boston ; Berlin : De Gruyter, [2015]
Description
xvi, 322 pages ; 24 cm.

Details

Subject(s)
Series
Bibliographic references
Includes bibliographical references (pages 273-281) and index.
Action note
Committed to retain in perpetuity — ReCAP Shared Collection (HUL)
Contents
  • Machine generated contents note: 1.1. Arguments Contra
  • 1.1.1. First argument
  • 1.1.2. Second argument
  • 1.1.3. Third argument
  • 1.2. Argument Pro
  • 1.3. Proposed Answer
  • 1.3.1. Definition of 'providence'
  • 1.3.2. Possibility of Providence
  • 1.3.3. Remark on terminology
  • 1.3.4. Result of chapter 1
  • 1.4. Answer to the Objections
  • 1.4.1. (to 1.1.1)
  • 1.4.2. (to 1.1.2)
  • 1.4.3. (to 1.1.3)
  • 2.1. Arguments Contra
  • 2.1.1. First argument
  • 2.1.2. Second argument
  • 2.2. Argument Pro
  • 2.3. Proposed Answer
  • 2.3.1. Result of chapter 2
  • 2.4. Answer to the Objections
  • 2.4.1. (to 2.1.1)
  • 2.4.2. (to 2.1.2)
  • 3.1. Arguments Contra
  • 3.1.1. First argument
  • 3.1.2. Second argument
  • 3.1.3. Third argument
  • 3.2. Argument Pro
  • 3.3. Proposed Answer
  • 3.3.1. Result of chapter 3
  • 3.4. Answer to the Objections
  • 3.4.1. (to 3.1.1)
  • 3.4.2. (to 3.1.2)
  • 3.4.3. (to 3.1.3)
  • 4.1. Arguments Contra
  • 4.1.1. First argument
  • 4.1.2. Second argument
  • 4.2. Argument Pro
  • 4.3. Proposed Answer
  • 4.3.1. Change by movement
  • 4.3.2. Thermodynamic change
  • 4.3.3. Quantum-mechanical change
  • 4.3.4. Result of chapter 4
  • 4.4. Answer to the Objections
  • 4.4.1. (to 4.1.1)
  • 4.4.2. (to 4.1.2)
  • 4.5. Conclusion
  • 5.1. Arguments Contra
  • 5.1.1. First argument
  • 5.1.2. Second argument
  • 5.2. Argument Pro
  • 5.3. Proposed Answer
  • 5.3.1. Things and systems
  • 5.3.2. Change and reversibility
  • 5.3.3. Order
  • 5.3.4. Becoming
  • 5.3.5. Teleological order
  • 5.3.6. Values and goals in non-living systems
  • 5.3.7. Result of chapter 5
  • 5.4. Answer to the Objections
  • 5.4.1. (to 5.1.1)
  • 5.4.2. (to 5.1.2)
  • 5.5. Conclusion
  • 6.1. Arguments Contra
  • 6.1.1. First argument
  • 6.1.2. Second argument
  • 6.1.3. Third argument
  • 6.2. Argument Pro
  • 6.3. Proposed Answer
  • 6.3.1. Extreme positions
  • 6.3.2. Randomness in arithmetic and geometry
  • 6.3.3. Kinds of chance and randomness concerning dynamical laws of nature
  • 6.3.4. Kinds of chance and randomness concerning statistical laws of nature
  • 6.3.5. Complexity and randomness of sequences
  • 6.3.6. Kinds of chance and randomness w.r.t. structure and order
  • 6.3.7. Kinds of chance and randomness w.r.t. teleological order
  • 6.3.8. Results of chapter 6
  • 6.4. Answer to the Objections
  • 6.4.1. (to 6.1.1)
  • 6.4.2. (to 6.1.2)
  • 6.4.3. (to 6.1.3)
  • 7.1. Arguments Contra
  • 7.1.1. First argument
  • 7.1.2. Second argument
  • 7.2. Arguments Pro
  • 7.2.1. First argument
  • 7.2.2. Second argument
  • 7.3. Proposed Answer
  • 7.3.1. Living system (Biosystem)
  • 7.3.2. Order and teleological order in living systems
  • 7.3.3. Values in living systems
  • 7.3.3.1. Primary, secondary and basic good of a living system
  • 7.3.3.2. Goods and values
  • 7.3.4. Values concerning the history of is
  • 7.3.5. Higher-level teleological order
  • 7.3.6. Higher human values
  • 7.3.6.1. Different kinds of higher values
  • 7.3.6.2. Values and norms
  • 7.3.7. Projected teleological order
  • 7.3.8. Result of chapter 7
  • 7.4. Answer to the Objections
  • 7.4.1. (to 7.1.1)
  • 7.4.2. (to 7.1.2)
  • 7.5. Conclusion
  • 8.1. Arguments Contra
  • 8.1.1. First argument
  • 8.1.2. Second argument
  • 8.2. Argument Pro
  • 8.3. Proposed Answer
  • 8.3.1. The question of randomness of the DNA-sequence
  • 8.3.2. The question of randomness and chance in the emergence of the DNA-sequence
  • 8.3.3. The question of the randomness of mutation
  • 8.3.4. Randomness and chance in the emergence of higher-level biological systems
  • 8.3.5. Randomness concerning the Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium
  • 8.3.6. Chance and randomness concerning goals and teleological order
  • 8.3.7. Conclusion concerning chance and randomness
  • 8.3.8. Results of chapter 8
  • 8.4. Answer to the Objections
  • 8.4.1. (to 8.1.1)
  • 8.4.2. (to 8.1.2)
  • 9.1. Arguments Contra
  • 9.1.1. First argument
  • 9.1.2. Second argument
  • 9.1.3. Third argument
  • 9.1.4. Fourth argument
  • 9.1.5. Fifth argument
  • 9.2. Argument Pro
  • 9.3. Proposed Answer
  • 9.3.1. Providence is compatible with any kind of order which is realized in the universe
  • 9.3.2. Providence is compatible with any kind of chance which is realized in the universe
  • 9.3.3. Result of chapter 9
  • 9.4. Answer to the Objections
  • 9.4.1. (to 9.1.1)
  • 9.4.2. (to 9.1.2)
  • 9.4.3. (to 9.1.3)
  • 9.4.4. (to 9.1.4)
  • 9.4.5. (to 9.1.5)
  • 10.1. Arguments Contra
  • 10.1.1. First argument
  • 10.1.2. Second argument
  • 10.1.3. Third argument
  • 10.1.4. Fourth argument
  • 10.1.5. Fifth argument
  • 10.2. Argument Pro
  • 10.3. Proposed Answer
  • 10.3.1. Definition of 'providence'
  • 10.3.2. Omnitemporal and temporal states of affairs (Df 10.1(b))
  • 10.3.3. Both states of affairs, those which hold for all times and those which hold for some time, come under God's providence
  • 10.3.4. Result of chapter 10
  • 10.4. Answer to the Objections
  • 10.4.1. (to 10.1.1)
  • 10.4.2. (to 10.1.2)
  • 10.4.3. (to 10.1.3)
  • 10.4.4. (to 10.1.4 and 10.1.5)
  • 11.1. Arguments Contra
  • 11.1.1. First argument
  • 11.1.2. Second argument
  • 11.2. Argument Pro
  • 11.3. Proposed Answer
  • 11.3.1. Does God know all laws and constants of the universe?
  • 11.3.2. Does God know all states, events, processes and initial conditions in the universe?
  • 11.3.3. God's knowledge of contingent future events
  • 11.3.4. Results of chapter 11
  • 11.4. Answer to the Objections
  • 11.4.1. (to 11.1.1)
  • 11.4.2. (to 11.1.2)
  • 12.1. Arguments Contra
  • 12.1.1. First argument
  • 12.1.2. Second argument
  • 12.2. Argument Pro
  • 12.3. Proposed Answer
  • 12.3.1. God permits order and teleological order
  • 12.3.2. God is not all-willing
  • 12.3.3. God's will is always fulfilled
  • 12.3.4. God wills order and teleological order
  • 12.3.5. God wills and permits chance and randomness
  • 12.3.6. Result of chapter 12
  • 12.4. Answer to the Objections
  • 12.4.1. (to 12.1.1 and 12.1.2)
  • 13.1. Arguments Contra
  • 13.1.1. First argument
  • 13.1.2. Second argument
  • 13.1.3. Third argument
  • 13.1.4. Fourth argument
  • 13.2. Argument Pro
  • 13.3. Proposed Answer
  • 13.3.1. The universe as a whole
  • 13.3.2. The universe of order and chance
  • 13.3.3. Self-organization
  • 13.3.4. Natural selection
  • 13.3.5. Development
  • 13.3.6. Evolution
  • 13.3.7. Transition from species A to variation A'
  • 13.3.8. Transition from species A to species B
  • 13.3.9. Heredity
  • 13.3.10. What cannot be caused by creatures (internal causes of the universe) on principal grounds must be caused by God and his providence
  • 13.3.10.1. Leibniz's answer
  • 13.3.10.2. Can the laws or theories of physics be complete?
  • 13.3.11. Result of chapter 13
  • 13.4. Answer to the Objections
  • 13.4.1. (to 13.1.1)
  • 13.4.2. (to 13.1.2)
  • 13.4.3. (to 13.1.3) Everlasting universe
  • 13.4.4. (to 13.1.4) Self-contained universe
  • 14.1. Arguments Contra
  • 14.1.1. First argument
  • 14.1.2. Second argument
  • 14.1.3. Third argument
  • 14.2. Argument Pro
  • 14.3. Proposed Answer
  • 14.3.1. Are biological processes teleological?
  • 14.3.2. Are non-biological processes teleological?
  • 14.3.3. Can all living systems be integrated into a network of goals extrinsic to the living system?
  • 14.3.4. Can all non-living systems be integrated into a network of goals?
  • 14.3.5. Can all obtaining states of affairs be integrated into a network of goals?
  • 14.3.5.1. Carbon-based life
  • 14.3.5.2. Evolutionarily stable strategy
  • 14.3.5.3. Queen Elizabeth l's goal
  • 14.3.5.4. Children's understanding of goals
  • 14.3.6. Functional explanation
  • 14.3.7. Reasons for integration into a network of goals
  • 14.3.8. Result of chapter 14
  • 14.4. Answer to the Objections
  • 14.4.1. (to 14.1.1)
  • 14.4.2. (to 14.1.2)
  • 14.4.3. (to 14.1.3)
  • 15.1. Arguments Contra
  • 15.1.1. First argument
  • 15.1.2. Second argument
  • 15.1.3. Third argument
  • 15.1.4. Fourth argument
  • 15.1.5. Fifth argument
  • 15.1.6. Sixth argument
  • 15.2. Argument Pro
  • 15.3. Proposed Answer
  • 15.3.1. Determinism and indeterminism
  • 15.3.2. Confusions concerning determinism, causality and prediction
  • 15.3.3. Attacks on men's free will decision: Neuronal Determinism
  • 15.3.4. Degrees of freedom on different levels
  • 15.3.5. Definition of free will and of free will decision
  • 15.3.5.1. Presuppositions of free will
  • 15.3.5.2. Definition of 'free will'
  • 15.3.5.3. Definition of 'free will decision'
  • 15.3.6. Compatibility of nature's order and free will
  • 15.3.7. Compatibility of providence and free will
  • 15.3.7.1. God's knowledge and free will
  • 15.3.7.2. Men's free will and God's will or permission
  • 15.3.7.3. Men's free will and the causation by God or by creatures
  • 15.3.7.4. Men's free will and the direction to some goal
  • 15.3.8. Conclusion
  • 15.3.9. Result of chapter 15
  • 15.4. Answer to the Objections
  • 15.4.1. (to 15.1.1)
  • 15.4.2. (to 15.1.2)
  • 15.4.3. (to 15.1.3)
  • 15.4.4. (to 15.1.4)
  • 15.4.5. (to 15.1.5)
  • 15.4.6. (to 15.1.6)
  • 16.1. Arguments Contra
  • 16.1.1. First argument
  • 16.1.2. Second argument
  • 16.1.3. Third argument
  • 16.1.4. Fourth argument
  • 16.1.5. Fifth argument
  • 16.1.6. Sixth argument
  • 16.2. Arguments Pro
  • 16.2.1. First argument
ISBN
9781614518914 (hd.bd.)
OCLC
888165541
RCP
H - S
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