Details

Subject(s)

• Postwar reconstruction—Iraq [Browse]
• Counterinsurgency—Iraq [Browse]

Related name

• O'Connell, Edward [Browse]

Series

• Rand counterinsurgency study ; v. 2. [More in this series]
• Rand counterinsurgency study ; v. 2 [More in this series]

Summary note

• Examines the deleterious effects of the U.S. failure to focus on protecting the Iraqi population for most of the military campaign in Iraq and analyzes the failure of a technologically driven counterinsurgency (COIN) approach. It outlines strategic considerations relative to COIN; presents an overview of the conflict in Iraq; describes implications for future operations; and offers recommendations to improve the U.S. capability to conduct COIN.
• This monograph outlines strategic considerations relative to counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns; presents an overview of the current conflict in Iraq, focusing on COIN; analyzes COIN operations in Iraq; presents conclusions about COIN, based on the U.S. experience in Iraq; describes implications from that experience for future COIN operations; and offers recommendations to improve the ability of the U.S. government to conduct COIN in the future. For example, U.S. COIN experience in Iraq has revealed the need to achieve synergy and balance among several simultaneous civilian and military efforts and the need to continually address and reassess the right indicators to determine whether current strategies are adequate. The need to continually reassess COIN strategy and tactics implies that military and civilian leaders must have not only the will, but also a formal mechanism, to fearlessly and thoroughly call to the attention of senior decisionmakers any shortfalls in policies and practices, e.g., in Iraq, failure to protect the civilian population, as well as overreliance on technological approaches to COIN. The Iraq experience is particularly germane to drawing lessons about COIN. In essence, the conflict there is a local political power struggle overlaid with sectarian violence and fueled by fanatical foreign jihadists and criminal opportunists--a combination of factors likely to be replicated in insurgencies elsewhere.

Bibliographic references

Includes bibliographical references (p. 99-106).

System details

• Mode of access: World Wide Web.
• System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.

Action note

Committed to retain in perpetuity — ReCAP Shared Collection (HUL)

Contents

• Summary
• Acknowledgements
• Abbreviations
• Overview of the conflict in Iraq
• Ba'athist regime
• Invasion of Iraq
• Occupation of Iraq
• First priority : setting up a constitutional government
• Spring
• The spiral downward begins (Spring 2004)
• Benchmark one : holding Iraqi elections
• Islamic extremists and sectarian violence
• A U.S. approach hesitantly unfold
• Armed groups in Iraq
• Overview
• Kurdish separatists
• Sunni Arab insurgents
• Violent extremists
• Shi'ite Arab militias
• Criminal gangs
• Insurgent use of terrorism
• Counterinsurgency in Iraq
• Organization and recognition of the U.S. COIN effort is slow to unfold
• Traditional U.S. military forces may need to be adjusted
• Fallujah
• Tal Afar
• Baghdad
• Air support
• Combatting improvised explosive devices
• Detainee operations
• U.S. development and support of Iraqi forces
• Iraqi police
• Iraqi armed forces
• Assessing progress in counterinsurgency --^
• Iraqi casualties and displacement
• Iraqi economy
• Iraqi opinion
• Accounting for success and failure
• Understanding Iraqi society
• Little planning for the occupation of Iraq
• The impact of a lack od international support for the war
• The disastrous effects of prematurely dismantling the Ba'athist regime
• The challenge of building a new Iraqi state from scratch
• Instituting a new system of justice
• Undertaking the reconstruction of Iraq
• The consequences of failing to maintain security early on military missions
• Lck of infiltration and tips hinder intelligence on the insurgency
• Building effective capabilities for counterinsurgency
• Use of force
• Public safety and security
• Partnering with and enabling indigenous forces
• Reporting on the enemy and infiltration
• Provision of essential services
• Informing and influencing operations
• Rigorous and coordinated detainee operations
• Recommendations
• Development of strategy
• Coalition-building --^
• Planning process
• Unity of effort
• Interagency process
• Host-nation governance
• Funding mechanisms
• Counterinsurgency as a mission
• Protection of the indigenous population
• Personnel policy
• U.S. Army special forces
• Partnership with indigenous forces
• Policing functions
• Brigade organization
• Gunship-like capability
• Intelligence collection and sharing.

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ISBN

• 9780833042972 (pbk. : alk. paper)
• 0833042971 (pbk. : alk. paper)

LCCN

^^2008001579

OCLC

190843537

RCP

H - S

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