LEADER 03643cam a2200505Ka 4500001 9999066483506421 005 20201007232228.0 006 m o d 007 cr mn |||||a|a 008 120402s2012 miu ob s001 0 eng d 019 786277963787852205817068611824114654923505166961594728962596278965995317988457749988477260991926775994899418103793550010386313701055338587105889061310648765341081219808 020 9780472028238 |q(electronic bk.) 020 0472028235 |q(electronic bk.) 020 |z1280128585 020 |z9781280128585 020 |z9780472118137 020 |z0472118137 035 |9(JSTORDDA)782923552 035 (OCoLC)ocn782923552 |z(OCoLC)ocn786277963 |z(OCoLC)ocn787852205 |z(OCoLC)ocn817068611 |z(OCoLC)ocn824114654 |z(OCoLC)ocn923505166 |z(OCoLC)ocn961594728 |z(OCoLC)ocn962596278 |z(OCoLC)ocn965995317 |z(OCoLC)ocn988457749 |z(OCoLC)ocn988477260 |z(OCoLC)ocn991926775 |z(OCoLC)ocn994899418 |z(OCoLC)on1037935500 |z(OCoLC)on1038631370 |z(OCoLC)on1055338587 |z(OCoLC)on1058890613 |z(OCoLC)on1064876534 |z(OCoLC)on1081219808 035 (NjP)9906648-princetondb 035 |z(OCoLC)786277963 |z(OCoLC)787852205 |z(OCoLC)817068611 |z(OCoLC)824114654 |z(OCoLC)923505166 |z(OCoLC)961594728 |z(OCoLC)962596278 |z(OCoLC)965995317 |z(OCoLC)988457749 |z(OCoLC)988477260 |z(OCoLC)991926775 |z(OCoLC)994899418 |z(OCoLC)1037935500 |z(OCoLC)1038631370 |z(OCoLC)1055338587 |z(OCoLC)1058890613 |z(OCoLC)1064876534 |z(OCoLC)1081219808 035 |z(NjP)Voyager9906648 037 22573/ctt1d8kj73 |bJSTOR 040 N$T |beng |epn |cN$T |dYDXCP |dIDEBK |dE7B |dCDX |dOCLCQ |dDKDLA |dOCLCF |dP@U |dOCLCQ |dOCLCO |dCOO |dEBLCP |dOCLCQ |dDEBSZ |dJSTOR 043 n-us--- 050 4 JK1991 |b.H42 2012eb 082 04 324.7/80973 |223 090 Electronic Resource 100 1 Heberlig, Eric S., |d1970- |0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n98072664 245 10 Congressional parties, institutional ambition, and the financing of majority control |h[electronic resource] / |cEric S. Heberlig and Bruce A. Larson. 260 Ann Arbor : |bUniversity of Michigan Press, |c2012. 300 1 online resource. 336 text |btxt |2rdacontent 337 computer |bc |2rdamedia 338 online resource |bcr |2rdacarrier 504 Includes bibliographical references and index. 588 0 Print version record. 520 Close competition for majority party control of the U.S. House of Representatives has transformed the congressional parties from legislative coalitions into partisan fundraising machines. With the need for ever increasing sums of money to fuel the ongoing campaign for majority control, both Republicans and Democrats have made large donations to the party and its candidates mandatory for members seeking advancement within party and congressional committee hierarchies. Eric S. Heberlig and Bruce A. Larson not only analyze this development, but also discuss its implications for American government and democracy. They address the consequences of selecting congressional leaders on the basis of their fundraising skills rather than their legislative capacity and the extent to which the battle for majority control leads Congress to prioritize short-term electoral gains over long-term governing and problem-solving. 599 Princeton permanent acquisition. 650 0 Campaign funds |zUnited States. |0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2008100035 650 7 Campaign funds. |2fast |0(OCoLC)fst00844844 651 7 United States. |2fast |0(OCoLC)fst01204155 700 1 Larson, Bruce A., |d1960- |0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n00110032 776 08 |iPrint version:Heberlig, Eric S., 1970- |tCongressional parties, institutional ambition, and the financing of majority control. |dAnn Arbor : University of Michigan Press, 2012 |z9780472118137 |w(DLC) 2011043627 |w(OCoLC)759050049 902 jwl |bz |6a |7m |dw |f0 |e20160818 910 JSTOR DDA purchased