Population games and evolutionary dynamics / William H. Sandholm.

Author
Sandholm, William H., 1970- [Browse]
Format
Book
Language
English
Published/​Created
Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, 2011.
Description
1 online resource (xxv, 589 pages)

Availability

Available Online

Details

Subject(s)
Series
  • MIT Press series on economic learning and social evolution [More in this series]
  • Economic learning and social evolution
Bibliographic references
Includes bibliographical references (pages 541-563) and indexes.
Contents
  • Introduction
  • Population games
  • Potential games, stable games, and supermodular games
  • Revision protocols and deterministic evolutionary dynamics
  • Deterministic dynamics: families and properties
  • Best response and projection dynamics
  • Global convergence of evolutionary dynamics
  • Local stability under evolutionary dynamics
  • Nonconvergence of evolutionary dynamics
  • Stochastic evolution and deterministic approximation
  • Stationary distributions and infinite horizon behavior
  • Limiting stationary distributions and stochastic stability.
ISBN
  • 9780262289740 ((electronic bk.))
  • 0262289741 ((electronic bk.))
  • 0262195879
  • 9780262195874
LCCN
2010011973
OCLC
739102834
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