Environmental enforcement and compliance : lessons from pollution, safety, and tax settings / James Alm, Jay Shimshack.

Author
Alm, James [Browse]
Format
Book
Language
English
Published/​Created
[Boston] : Now, [2014]
Description
1 online resource (iii, pages 209-274)

Availability

Available Online

Details

Subject(s)
Author
Series
  • Foundations and trends in microeconomics ; v. 10, no. 4. [More in this series]
  • Foundations and Trends in Microeconomics ; vol. 10, no. 4
Summary note
Environmental monitoring and enforcement are controversial and incompletely understood. This survey reviews what we do and do not know about the overall effectiveness, as well as the cost effectiveness, of pollution monitoring and enforcement. We ask five key questions: what do environmental monitoring and enforcement actions look like in the real world? How do we assess environmental compliance and deterrence? Do environmental monitoring and enforcement actions get results? How, why, and when do inspections and sanctions achieve compliance and reduce pollution? And, what do the answers to the preceding questions tell us about designing and implementing more effective and more cost effective public policies for the environment? A key contribution is drawing lessons from diverse sources, including insights from theoretical, empirical, and experimental contributions in environmental, tax, and safety settings. We conclude that traditional environmental monitoring and enforcement actions generate important deterrence effects. However, there are limits to such deterrence, and deterrence itself cannot fully explain all patterns of environmental behavior. Encouraging compliance requires both traditional tools and additional tools.
Bibliographic references
Includes bibliographical references (pages 262-274).
Source of description
Description based on online resource; title from PDF caption (Now, viewed October 28, 2015).
Contents
  • 2. The U.S. approach to monitoring and enforcement
  • 2.1 Authority
  • 2.2 Instruments
  • 2.3 Public activities
  • 2.4 Private enforcement
  • 3. Assessing compliance
  • 3.1 Metrics for measuring compliance
  • 3.2 Measuring compliance with self-reported data
  • 4. Assessing impacts of environmental monitoring
  • 4.1 Inspections, penalties influence environmental performance
  • 4.2 Empirically and experimentally measuring deterrence
  • 5. Do monitoring and enforcement get results?
  • 5.1 Empirical explorations of specific deterrence
  • 5.2 Empirical explorations of general deterrence
  • 6. Empirical explorations of deterrence in other settings
  • 6.1 Empirical and experimental evidence from occupational
  • 6.2 Empirical and experimental evidence
  • 7. Explaining compliance
  • 7.1 The simple rational actor paradigm
  • 7.2 Extending the simple rational actor paradigm
  • 7.3 The socio-behavioral paradigm
  • 9. Conclusion
  • References.
OCLC
903404434
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