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Moral hazard and benefits consumption capital in program overlap : the case of workers' compensation / Richard J. Butler and Harold H. Gardner.
Author
Butler, Richard J., 1950-
[Browse]
Format
Book
Language
English
Published/Created
Boston : Now, ©2011.
Description
1 online resource (pages 477-528)
Availability
Available Online
Online Content
Details
Subject(s)
Employee fringe benefits
—
United States
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Workers' compensation
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Related name
Gardner, Harold H.
[Browse]
Series
Foundations and trends in microeconomics ; v. 5, no. 8.
[More in this series]
Foundations and trends in microeconomics ; v. 5, no. 8
[More in this series]
Summary note
In this paper we review and extend the analysis of moral hazard response in two relatively unexamined empirical directions: (1) how insurance changes in one program affects employee participation in other programs at a point in time (inter-program moral hazard), and (2) how the consumption of program benefits now tends to affect employees behavior over time (benefits consumption capital). We develop a formal model of inter-program moral hazard based on workers' compensation with programs overlapping it (including sick leave, health insurance, and unemployment insurance), and review evidence concerning this overlap response. We also provide new evidence on benefits consumption capital concerning workers' compensation using data from one large private employer in the US.
Notes
Title from PDF t.p. (NOW, viewed March 12, 2013).
Bibliographic references
Includes bibliographical references (p. 524-528).
Contents
2. Worker' compensation/sick leave as prototypes for program overlap
U.S. WC and sick leave, institutional details
Incentives under the overlapping WC/sick leave programs
Incentives under the overlapping WC/sick leave programs --
3. Evidence of inter-program moral hazard
Empirical evidence of WC/sick leave overlap
WC and unemployment insurance overlap --
4. Benefits consumption capital, inter-temporal moral hazard
Multivariate tests: controlling for heterogeneity across workers --
5. Moral hazard and the concentration of non-wage benefits --
6. Some concluding observations
References.
Show 9 more Contents items
ISBN
9781601984296 ((electronic bk.))
1601984294 ((electronic bk.))
OCLC
712805919
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