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Philosophy without intuitions / Herman Cappelen.
Author
Cappelen, Herman
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Format
Book
Language
English
Εdition
1st ed.
Published/Created
Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2012.
Description
xii, 242 pages ; 23 cm
Availability
Available Online
Oxford Scholarship - Oxford University Press: Philosophy
Copies in the Library
Location
Call Number
Status
Location Service
Notes
Firestone Library - Stacks
BD241 .C335 2012
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Details
Subject(s)
Methodology
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Intuition
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Evidence
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Summary note
The standard view of philosophical methodology is that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence. Herman Cappelen argues that this claim is false, and reveals how it has encouraged pseudo-problems, presented misguided ideas of what philosophy is, and misled exponents of metaphilosophy and experimental philosophy.
"The claim that contemporary analytic philosophers rely extensively on intuitions as evidence is almost universally accepted in current meta-philosophical debates and it figures prominently in our self-understanding as analytic philosophers. No matter what area you happen to work in and what views you happen to hold in those areas, you are likely to think that philosophizing requires constructing cases and making intuitive judgments about those cases. This assumption also underlines the entire experimental philosophy movement: only if philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence are data about non-philosophers' intuitions of any interest to us. Our alleged reliance on the intuitive makes many philosophers who don't work on meta-philosophy concerned about their own discipline: they are unsure what intuitions are and whether they can carry the evidential weight we allegedly assign to them. The goal of this book is to argue that this concern is unwarranted since the claim is false: it is not true that philosophers rely extensively (or even a little bit) on intuitions as evidence. At worst, analytic philosophers are guilty of engaging in somewhat irresponsible use of 'intuition'-vocabulary. While this irresponsibility has had little effect on first order philosophy, it has fundamentally misled meta-philosophers: it has encouraged meta-philosophical pseudo-problems and misleading pictures of what philosophy is."--Publisher's website.
Bibliographic references
Includes bibliographical references (p. [231]-237) and index.
Contents
The argument from 'intuition'-talk. Introduction to part I
'Intuitive', 'intuitively', 'intuition' and 'seem' in English
Philosophers' use of 'intuitive'(I): a defective practice and the verbal virus theory
Philosophers' use of 'intuitive' (II): some strategies for charitable reinterpretation
Philosophers' use of 'intuitive' (III): against the explaining away of intuitions
The argument from philosophical practice. Centrality and philosophical practice
Diagnostics for intuitiveness
Case studies
Lessons learned, replies to objections, and comparison to Williamson
Conceptual analysis and intuitions
A big mistake: experimental philosophy
Concluding remarks
Show 9 more Contents items
ISBN
9780199644865 ((hardback))
0199644861 ((hardback))
9780198703020
0198703023
LCCN
2012930985
OCLC
759177673
Other standard number
40020908867
Statement on language in description
Princeton University Library aims to describe library materials in a manner that is respectful to the individuals and communities who create, use, and are represented in the collections we manage.
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Philosophy without intuitions [electronic resource] / Herman Cappelen.
id
99125279392606421