Philosophy without intuitions / Herman Cappelen.

Author
Cappelen, Herman [Browse]
Format
Book
Language
English
Εdition
1st ed.
Published/​Created
Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2012.
Description
xii, 242 pages ; 23 cm

Availability

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Firestone Library - Stacks BD241 .C335 2012 Browse related items Request

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    Subject(s)
    Summary note
    • The standard view of philosophical methodology is that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence. Herman Cappelen argues that this claim is false, and reveals how it has encouraged pseudo-problems, presented misguided ideas of what philosophy is, and misled exponents of metaphilosophy and experimental philosophy.
    • "The claim that contemporary analytic philosophers rely extensively on intuitions as evidence is almost universally accepted in current meta-philosophical debates and it figures prominently in our self-understanding as analytic philosophers. No matter what area you happen to work in and what views you happen to hold in those areas, you are likely to think that philosophizing requires constructing cases and making intuitive judgments about those cases. This assumption also underlines the entire experimental philosophy movement: only if philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence are data about non-philosophers' intuitions of any interest to us. Our alleged reliance on the intuitive makes many philosophers who don't work on meta-philosophy concerned about their own discipline: they are unsure what intuitions are and whether they can carry the evidential weight we allegedly assign to them. The goal of this book is to argue that this concern is unwarranted since the claim is false: it is not true that philosophers rely extensively (or even a little bit) on intuitions as evidence. At worst, analytic philosophers are guilty of engaging in somewhat irresponsible use of 'intuition'-vocabulary. While this irresponsibility has had little effect on first order philosophy, it has fundamentally misled meta-philosophers: it has encouraged meta-philosophical pseudo-problems and misleading pictures of what philosophy is."--Publisher's website.
    Bibliographic references
    Includes bibliographical references (p. [231]-237) and index.
    Contents
    • The argument from 'intuition'-talk. Introduction to part I
    • 'Intuitive', 'intuitively', 'intuition' and 'seem' in English
    • Philosophers' use of 'intuitive'(I): a defective practice and the verbal virus theory
    • Philosophers' use of 'intuitive' (II): some strategies for charitable reinterpretation
    • Philosophers' use of 'intuitive' (III): against the explaining away of intuitions
    • The argument from philosophical practice. Centrality and philosophical practice
    • Diagnostics for intuitiveness
    • Case studies
    • Lessons learned, replies to objections, and comparison to Williamson
    • Conceptual analysis and intuitions
    • A big mistake: experimental philosophy
    • Concluding remarks
    ISBN
    • 9780199644865 ((hardback))
    • 0199644861 ((hardback))
    • 9780198703020
    • 0198703023
    LCCN
    2012930985
    OCLC
    759177673
    Other standard number
    • 40020908867
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