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008    231019s2022    dcu     o     000 0 eng d
024 7  10.1596/1813-9450-10186
035    (CKB)5680000000135742
035    (NjHacI)995680000000135742
035    (EXLCZ)995680000000135742
040    NjHacI |beng |erda |cNjHacl
050  4 JF1601 |b.M367
082 04 300.18 |223
100 1  Mansuri, Ghazala, |eauthor.
245 10 Money versus Kudos : |bThe Impact of Incentivizing Local Politicians in India / |cGhazala Mansuri [and three others].
246    Money versus Kudos
264  1 Washington, DC : |bWorld Bank, |c2022.
300    1 online resource.
336    text |btxt |2rdacontent
337    computer |bc |2rdamedia
338    online resource |bcr |2rdacarrier
490 1  Policy research working papers ; |v10186
588    Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.
520    Despite growing awareness of the various limitations of electoral democracy, there is a relative lack of evidence on effective policy interventions to improve the performance of elected officials and motivate them to act more equitably. This paper reports the results from an experiment in which elected presidents of village governments in Tamil Nadu, India, were randomly assigned to one of two incentive schemes (or a control group): a financial incentive that rewarded better performing presidents with a higher public budget, and a nonfinancial incentive that awarded them a certificate demonstrating their achievement with an information campaign to disseminate it. The findings show that both incentives improved access to public investments and private transfers in the villages of incentivized presidents. The nonfinancial incentive also led to a more equitable between-hamlet allocation of resources within the village, and this effect was more acute with officials who faced potentially more competitive elections. The paper shows that the results are consistent with a theoretical model where imperfect voter information drives inequities in resource allocation, and interventions that provide credible information on politician quality motivate elected representatives to act more equitably.
650  0 Public officers.
830  0 Policy research working papers ; |v10186.
906    BOOK