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005    20231009124541.0
006    m     o  d
007    cr |||||||||||
008    231009s2023    dcu     o     000 0 eng d
024 7  10.1596/1813-9450-10349
035    (CKB)5840000000243480
035    (NjHacI)995840000000243480
035    (EXLCZ)995840000000243480
040    NjHacI |beng |erda |cNjHacl
050  4 RA427.8 |b.S45 2023
082 04 362.1 |223
100 1  Seitz, William, |eauthor.
245 10 Can vaccination incentives backfire? : |bexperimental evidence that offering cash incentives can reduce vaccination intentions in some contexts / |cWilliam Seitz, Satoshi Shimizutani, Eiji Yamada.
264  1 Washington, Distict of Columbia : |bWorld Bank, |c2023.
300    1 online resource (23 pages).
336    text |btxt |2rdacontent
337    computer |bc |2rdamedia
338    online resource |bcr |2rdacarrier
490 1  Policy research working papers ; |v10349
588    Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.
520    This paper studies the effect of proposing a monetary incentive for vaccination intentions, with a survey-based randomized controlled experiment conducted separately in three countries, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. Respondents from nationally representative surveys were randomly assigned to a control group (for which no incentive was proposed) or to one of several treatment groups with varying levels of hypothetical compensation. Offering incentives markedly reduced overall vaccination intentions -all three counties. Country-level results ranged from no meaningful effect on vaccination intentions (Tajikistan) to a decline of up to 22 percent (Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan). In follow-up questions, most respondents said they disapprove of offering financial incentives for vaccination, and especially in contexts with strong negative effects in the experiment. The results contrast with the well-established efficacy of monetary incentives to influence vaccination behavior in other settings, but they are consistent with findings from the behavioral literature in which incentive payments signal inferiority or disutility. The findings suggest that policy makers and practitioners should use caution when considering extrinsic incentives for vaccination and other health interventions where effects have not been tested.
650  0 Health promotion.
700 1  Shimizutani, Satoshi, |eauthor.
700 1  Yamada, Eiji, |eauthor.
830  0 Policy research working papers ; |v10349.
906    BOOK