LEADER 01839nam a2200433 i 4500001 99130894812406421 005 20240118114700.0 006 m|||||o||d|||||||| 007 cr cnu|||||||| 008 230921s2023 enk fob 001|0|eng|d 020 0-19-196555-3 020 0-19-269639-4 020 0-19-269638-6 024 7 10.1093/oso/9780192869500.001.0001 |2doi 035 (MiAaPQ)EBC7372357 035 (Au-PeEL)EBL7372357 035 (OCoLC)1410591941 035 (OCoLC)1406150198 035 (StDuBDS)9780191965555 035 (CKB)29014085300041 035 (EXLCZ)9929014085300041 040 StDuBDS |beng |cStDuBDS |erda |epn 050 4 BD171 |b.W7 2023 072 7 PHI |2ukslc 072 7 QDTK |2thema 082 0 302 |223 100 1 Wrenn, Chase B., |d1974- |eauthor. 245 14 The true and the good : |ba strong virtue theory of the value of truth / |cChase B. Wrenn. 264 1 Oxford : |bOxford University Press, |c2023. 300 1 online resource (0 pages) 336 text |btxt |2rdacontent 337 computer |bc |2rdamedia 338 online resource |bcr |2rdacarrier 490 1 Oxford scholarship online 505 0 Cover -- The True and the Good: A Strong Virtue Theory of the Value of Truth -- Copyright -- Contents -- Preface -- 1: The Problem of Truth's Value -- 1.1 Our Interest in the Truth -- 1.2 Two Conceptions of Truth -- 1.2.1 Normativism -- 1.2.2 Aristotelianism -- 1.3 Solving the Problem of Truth's Value -- 1.4 Roadmap -- 1.5 Conventions -- 2: Truth and Virtue -- 2.1 The Value-Conferral Model -- 2.2 Virtues -- 2.3 Truthfulness and Its Rivals -- 2.4 Why Truthfulness Is a Virtue -- 2.4.1 Trustworthiness and the Collaborative Pursuit of the Good -- 2.4.2 Epistemic Justice -- 2.4.3 Polarization -- 2.4.4 A Society Worth Having -- 2.5 Beyond the Value-Conferral Model -- 2.6 State-Given Reasons -- 2.7 Conclusion -- 3: Truth-Oriented Desires -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Why Truth-Oriented Desires? -- 3.3 Desiring Truth -- 3.4 Horwich's Proposal -- 3.4.1 The Deflationism of Horwich's Proposal -- 3.4.2 Hasty Generalization -- 3.4.3 Particularism -- 3.5 Deflationism and Valuing Truth -- 3.5.1 A Non-Reductive Deflationism -- 3.5.2 Valuing Truth Generically -- 3.6 Conclusion -- 4: Against Normativism -- 4.1 Why Not Normativism? -- 4.2 The Core Commitments of Normativism -- 4.3 Blindspots and Brightspots -- 4.4 Deflationary Normativism? -- 4.5 The Aristotelian Advantage -- 5: Truth and Instrumental Value -- 5.1 The Instrumental Value-Conferral Model -- 5.2 The Standard Arguments -- 5.3 Against Truth's Instrumental Value -- 5.4 Instrumentally Valuing Truth -- 6: Truth and Intrinsic Value -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 What Is Intrinsic Value? -- 6.3 Pointlessness -- 6.4 Minimal Intrinsic Value -- 6.5 Incommensurability -- 6.6 Vanishing Value -- 6.6.1 Valuing Truth Is Good for Us -- 6.6.2 Value Autonomization and Evaluative Conditioning -- 6.6.3 Truth as the Internal Goal of Belief -- 6.7 Modes of Valuing, Deflationism, and the Strong Virtue Theory. 505 8 7: Truth and Epistemic Standards -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 The Regulative Epistemic Value-Conferral Model -- 7.3 Horwich Against the Truth-PromotionStandard -- 7.4 Rattan and Critical Reflection -- 7.5 Triviality's Return -- 7.6 Reconsidering Truth's Epistemic Value -- 7.7 The Strong Virtue Theory and Truth as a Regulative Epistemic Good -- 8: Truth as the Goal of Inquiry -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 Against True Beliefs as the Goal of Inquiry -- 8.3 Sincerely and Rationally Pursuing Goals -- 8.4 Inquiring When You Have the Answer -- 8.5 Sham Inquiry -- 8.6 Inquisitive Attitudes -- 8.7 Probabilistically "Having an Answer" -- 8.8 Alternative Interpretations of the Cases -- 8.9 A Different View of Inquiry's Goal -- 8.10 The Strong Virtue Theory and Final Epistemic Value -- 9: Conclusion: The Strong Virtue Theory -- 9.1 Introduction -- 9.2 Recapitulation -- 9.3 Alternative Theories and Minimal Theoretical Resources -- Bibliography -- Index. 521 Specialized. 500 Also issued in print: 2023. 504 Includes bibliographical references and index. 520 8 The problem of truth's value is the problem of reconciling a good theory of what truth is with a good theory of why it is valuable. This is the first monograph focused on solving it for theories that construe truth in a purely descriptive way. Chase Wrenn proposes a virtue-theoretic understanding of truth's value. 588 Description based on online resource and publisher information; title from PDF title page (viewed on October 25, 2023). 650 0 Truth. 650 0 Values. 650 7 Philosophy. |2ukslc 650 7 Philosophy: epistemology & theory of knowledge. |2thema 776 08 |iPrint version:Wrenn, Chase B. |tThe True and the Good |dOxford : Oxford University Press, Incorporated,c2024 |z9780192869500 830 0 Oxford scholarship online. 906 BOOK