Details

Subject(s)

• Truth [Browse]
• Values [Browse]

Series

Oxford scholarship online. [More in this series]

Summary note

The problem of truth's value is the problem of reconciling a good theory of what truth is with a good theory of why it is valuable. This is the first monograph focused on solving it for theories that construe truth in a purely descriptive way. Chase Wrenn proposes a virtue-theoretic understanding of truth's value.

Notes

Also issued in print: 2023.

Bibliographic references

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Target audience

Specialized.

Source of description

Description based on online resource and publisher information; title from PDF title page (viewed on October 25, 2023).

Contents

• Cover
• The True and the Good: A Strong Virtue Theory of the Value of Truth
• Copyright
• Contents
• Preface
• 1: The Problem of Truth's Value
• 1.1 Our Interest in the Truth
• 1.2 Two Conceptions of Truth
• 1.2.1 Normativism
• 1.2.2 Aristotelianism
• 1.3 Solving the Problem of Truth's Value
• 1.4 Roadmap
• 1.5 Conventions
• 2: Truth and Virtue
• 2.1 The Value-Conferral Model
• 2.2 Virtues
• 2.3 Truthfulness and Its Rivals
• 2.4 Why Truthfulness Is a Virtue
• 2.4.1 Trustworthiness and the Collaborative Pursuit of the Good
• 2.4.2 Epistemic Justice
• 2.4.3 Polarization
• 2.4.4 A Society Worth Having
• 2.5 Beyond the Value-Conferral Model
• 2.6 State-Given Reasons
• 2.7 Conclusion
• 3: Truth-Oriented Desires
• 3.1 Introduction
• 3.2 Why Truth-Oriented Desires?
• 3.3 Desiring Truth
• 3.4 Horwich's Proposal
• 3.4.1 The Deflationism of Horwich's Proposal
• 3.4.2 Hasty Generalization
• 3.4.3 Particularism
• 3.5 Deflationism and Valuing Truth
• 3.5.1 A Non-Reductive Deflationism
• 3.5.2 Valuing Truth Generically
• 3.6 Conclusion
• 4: Against Normativism
• 4.1 Why Not Normativism?
• 4.2 The Core Commitments of Normativism
• 4.3 Blindspots and Brightspots
• 4.4 Deflationary Normativism?
• 4.5 The Aristotelian Advantage
• 5: Truth and Instrumental Value
• 5.1 The Instrumental Value-Conferral Model
• 5.2 The Standard Arguments
• 5.3 Against Truth's Instrumental Value
• 5.4 Instrumentally Valuing Truth
• 6: Truth and Intrinsic Value
• 6.1 Introduction
• 6.2 What Is Intrinsic Value?
• 6.3 Pointlessness
• 6.4 Minimal Intrinsic Value
• 6.5 Incommensurability
• 6.6 Vanishing Value
• 6.6.1 Valuing Truth Is Good for Us
• 6.6.2 Value Autonomization and Evaluative Conditioning
• 6.6.3 Truth as the Internal Goal of Belief
• 6.7 Modes of Valuing, Deflationism, and the Strong Virtue Theory.
• 7: Truth and Epistemic Standards
• 7.1 Introduction
• 7.2 The Regulative Epistemic Value-Conferral Model
• 7.3 Horwich Against the Truth-PromotionStandard
• 7.4 Rattan and Critical Reflection
• 7.5 Triviality's Return
• 7.6 Reconsidering Truth's Epistemic Value
• 7.7 The Strong Virtue Theory and Truth as a Regulative Epistemic Good
• 8: Truth as the Goal of Inquiry
• 8.1 Introduction
• 8.2 Against True Beliefs as the Goal of Inquiry
• 8.3 Sincerely and Rationally Pursuing Goals
• 8.4 Inquiring When You Have the Answer
• 8.5 Sham Inquiry
• 8.6 Inquisitive Attitudes
• 8.7 Probabilistically "Having an Answer"
• 8.8 Alternative Interpretations of the Cases
• 8.9 A Different View of Inquiry's Goal
• 8.10 The Strong Virtue Theory and Final Epistemic Value
• 9: Conclusion: The Strong Virtue Theory
• 9.1 Introduction
• 9.2 Recapitulation
• 9.3 Alternative Theories and Minimal Theoretical Resources
• Bibliography
• Index.

Show 81 more Contents items

ISBN

• 0-19-196555-3
• 0-19-269639-4
• 0-19-269638-6

OCLC

• 1410591941
• 1406150198

Doi

• 10.1093/oso/9780192869500.001.0001

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