The political economy of lobbying : channels of influence and their regulation / Karsten Mause, Andreas Polk, editors.

Format
Book
Language
English
Published/​Created
Cham, Switzerland : Springer, [2023]
Description
vi, 384 pages : illustrations (chiefly color), color map ; 25 cm.

Details

Subject(s)
Editor
Series
Summary note
Lobbying is not only the subject of ongoing, heated debates in politics and the public sphere but has also been a focus of the social sciences for decades. This edited volume provides an overview of the current state of research on lobbying from the perspective of Public Choice as a subfield of political science and economics. After a brief introduction to the field, Part I provides an overview of basic concepts and political-economic theories of lobbying from the standpoints of various subfields of Public Choice. Subsequently, Part II investigates the various channels used by interest groups to influence policymakers, such as party donations, informational lobbying, hiring politicians, etc. These chapters also discuss the possibilities and limits of regulating the respective channels. Lastly, Part III sheds light on lobbying in selected regions (i.e., the United States, European Union, Russia, and China).
Bibliographic references
Includes bibliographical references.
Contents
  • Intro
  • Contents
  • Introduction
  • 1 Introduction
  • 1.1 Theoretical Background: Politico-Economic Theories of Lobbying
  • 1.2 Channels of Influence and Their Regulation
  • 1.3 Lobbying in Selected World Regions
  • References
  • Part I: Theoretical Background
  • Lobbying: A Public Choice Perspective
  • 2 Group Formation
  • 2.1 Olsonś Collective Action Argument
  • 2.2 Endogenous Group Formation
  • 3 Contributions
  • 3.1 Influence on Policy
  • 3.2 Influence on Elections
  • 4 Informational Lobbying
  • 4.1 Signaling models
  • 4.2 Mass Movements
  • 4.3 Lobbying Agencies
  • 5 Specific Questions
  • 5.1 Endogenous Group Formation
  • 5.2 Lobbying Strategies
  • 5.2.1 The Channel of Influence
  • 5.2.2 Lobbying: Alone or Together?
  • 5.3 Choice of the Policy Instrument
  • 5.4 Contribution Caps
  • 6 Conclusions
  • Lobbying from the Perspective of Behavioral Political Economy
  • 2 The Behavioral Economics Perspective on Policy Decisions
  • 2.1 From the Neoclassical to the Behavioral Economic Approach
  • 2.2 The Behavioral Economic Theory of Politics
  • 3 Starting Points for Behaviorally Economically Motivated Interest Policy
  • 3.1 Lobbying Addressees
  • 3.2 Influencing Risk Perceptions
  • 3.3 Framing
  • 3.4 Expressive Behavior and Belief Consumption
  • 3.5 Where Do We Stand?
  • 4 Case Studies
  • 4.1 The Framing Manual
  • 4.2 The Debate on an Embargo Against Russian Energy Supplies
  • 5 Conclusion
  • Policy Failure and Lobbying
  • 2 Conceptual Approach: Market Failure in the Market for Political Services
  • 2.1 Policy Failure as Market Failure in the Market for Political Services
  • 2.2 Monopoly Power in Politics
  • 2.3 Asymmetric Information
  • 2.4 Externalities
  • 3 Lobbying in the Market for Political Services
  • 3.1 The Influence of Lobbies
  • 3.2 Money Is Important, but Far from Everything
  • 4 Reduction of Market Failures in the Market for Political Services
  • 4.1 Traditional Instruments for More Competition
  • 4.2 Ideas for New Forms of Competition
  • 5 Conclusions
  • Lobbying and Macroeconomic Development
  • 2 Theories of Special Interest Groups
  • 2.1 The Logic of Collective Action
  • 2.2 The Rise and Decline of Nations
  • 3 Criticism and Discussion of Mancur Olsonś Works
  • 4 Empirical Literature on Institutional Sclerosis
  • 4.1 Regression Analytical Studies
  • 4.2 Case Studies
  • Part II: Channels of Influence and Their Regulation
  • Informational Lobbying
  • 2 Why Transparency Is Not the Solution
  • 3 The Economics Discipline: Lobbying Is Transactional and Wasteful
  • 3.1 The Logic of Collective Action
  • 3.2 An Informational Interlude
  • 3.3 Policy for Sale
  • 4 Political Science: Lobbying Is Informational and Functional
  • 4.1 The Logic of Congressional Action
  • 4.2 A Sociological Interlude
ISBN
  • 9783031443923
  • 3031443926 (hardcover)
OCLC
1394893482
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