<oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd"><dc:title>School Turnarounds : Evidence from the 2009 Stimulus</dc:title><dc:creator>Dee, Thomas S.</dc:creator><dc:language>English</dc:language><dc:format>Book</dc:format><dc:description>The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) targeted substantial School Improvement Grants (SIGs) to the nation's "persistently lowest achieving" public schools (i.e., up to $2 million per school annually over 3 years) but required schools accepting these awards to implement a federally prescribed school-reform model. Schools that met the "lowest-achieving" and "lack of progress" thresholds within their state had prioritized eligibility for these SIG-funded interventions. Using data from California, this study leverages these two discontinuous eligibility rules to identify the effects of SIG-funded whole-school reforms. The results based on these "fuzzy" regression-discontinuity designs indicate that there were significant improvements in the test-based performance of schools on the "lowest-achieving" margin but not among schools on the "lack of progress" margin. Complementary panel-based estimates suggest that these improvements were largely concentrated among schools adopting the federal "turnaround" model, which compels more dramatic staff turnover.</dc:description><dc:date>2012</dc:date><dc:publisher>Cambridge, MA : National Bureau of Economic Research, 2012.</dc:publisher><dc:subject>School improvement programs</dc:subject><dc:subject>Teachers—Selection and appointment</dc:subject><dc:subject>School administrators—Selection and appointment</dc:subject><dc:type>Book</dc:type></oai_dc:dc>