Details

Subject(s)

• Lenders of last resort [Browse]
• International finance—Econometric models [Browse]
• Foreign exchange—Econometric models [Browse]
• Banks and banking, International [Browse]
• Financial institutions, International [Browse]
• Financial crises—Developing countries [Browse]

Author

Wyplosz, Charles [Browse]

Series

Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ; Number 8381. [More in this series]

Summary note

This paper considers how an international lender of last resort (LOLR) can prevent self-fulfilling banking and currency crises in emerging economies. We compare two different arrangements: one in which the international LOLR injects liquidity into international financial markets, and one in which its resources are used to back domestic banking safety nets. Both arrangements would require important changes in the global financial architecture: the first one would require a global central bank issuing an international currency, while the second one would have to be operated by an 'international banking fund' closely involved in the supervision of domestic banking systems.

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