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Advances in cryptology - CRYPTO 2022. Part III : 42nd Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 2022, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 15-18, 2022, proceedings / Yevgeniy Dodis and Thomas Shrimpton.
Author
Dodis, Yevgeniy
[Browse]
Format
Book
Language
English
Published/Created
Cham, Switzerland : Springer International Publishing, [2022]
©2022
Description
1 online resource (813 pages)
Availability
Available Online
Springer Nature - Springer Lecture Notes in Computer Science eBooks
Springer Nature - Springer Computer Science eBooks 2022 English International
Details
Subject(s)
Data encryption (Computer science)
[Browse]
Data encryption (Computer science)
—
Congresses
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Author
Shrimpton, Thomas
[Browse]
Series
Lecture notes in computer science.
[More in this series]
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Source of description
Description based on print version record.
Contents
Intro
Preface
Organization
Contents - Part III
Signatures
.26em plus .1em minus .1emPI-Cut-Choo and Friends: Compact Blind Signatures via Parallel Instance Cut-and-Choose and More
1 Introduction
1.1 Starting Point: The Basic Boosting Transform
1.2 Our Contribution: Improved Boosting Transforms
2 Preliminaries
3 An Improved Boosting Transform
3.1 Overview
3.2 Blind Signatures from Linear Function Families
3.3 Construction
3.4 Security Analysis
4 A Concrete Scheme Based on CDH
4.1 Overview
4.2 Construction
4.3 Security Analysis
5 A Concrete Scheme Based on RSA
References
Idealized Models
Augmented Random Oracles
1.1 Augmented Random Oracles
1.2 Best Possible Hash Functions?
1.3 Our Results
1.4 A Classification of ROM Failures
1.5 Discussion: Do We Really Need Another ROM Variant?
2.1 Cryptosystems and Games
2.2 Cryptographic Definitions
3 The Augmented Random Oracle Model
3.1 The Plain ROM
3.2 Augmented Random Oracles
3.3 Some Basic Results
4 A Case Study: Encrypt-with-Hash
4.1 The (Tweaked) EwH Transform
4.2 Uninstantiability of EwH
4.3 Translation to the AROM
4.4 An Improved Uninstantiability
4.5 Other Possible Oracles
4.6 Overcoming ROM Failures for EwH
5 Fujisaki-Okamoto in the AROM
5.1 Our CCA-secure Construction
6 Fiat-Shamir in the AROM
7 On Best Possible Hashing
7.1 Incompatibility of the Definitions
To Label, or Not To Label (in Generic Groups)
1.1 Overview of Results
1.2 Takeaways
1.3 Organization
2 Preliminaries and Notation
2.1 Games and Cryptosystems
2.2 Groups
3 Different Generic Group Models
3.1 Random Representation (RR)/Shoup Model ch3EC:Shoup97
3.2 Maurer's Model ch3IMA:Maurer05.
3.3 The Type Safe (TS) Model
3.4 Examples
3.5 Compiling TS to RR
3.6 From TS Security to RR Security for Single-Stage Games
4 Further Impossibilities in the Type Safe Model
4.1 Collision Resistant Domain Extension
4.2 Pseudorandom Permutations
4.3 Efficient CPA-Secure Encryption for Message Strings
5 On the Insecurity of the Type-Safe Model for Multi-stage Games
6 TS Un-instantiability
6.1 Overview
6.2 Our Un-instantiable Construction
7 Impossibility of IBE from Generic Groups
8 On the Algebraic Group Model
8.1 Allowed Games in the AGM
8.2 AGM Un-instantiability
8.3 Is the AGM Superior to Generic Groups?
Lower Bound on SNARGs in the Random Oracle Model
1.1 Our Results
1.2 Related Work
2 Techniques
2.1 Warmup
2.2 Actual Scenario
2.3 Completeness
2.4 Soundness
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Notations
3.2 Entropy Measures
3.3 Randomized Exponential Time Hypothesis
3.4 Random Oracles
3.5 Non-interactive Arguments in the ROM
4 Hitting High-Entropy Distribution Using Product Sets
4.1 High-Entropy Distributions Have an (Almost) Uniform Large Projection, Proving Lemma 3
4.2 Hitting Almost Full-Entropy Distributions Using Product Set, Proving Lemma 4
5 Lower Bound on the Length of ROM-SNARGs
5.1 Proof of Theorem 13
5.2 Short ROM-SNARGs to Low Query ROM-SNARGs, Proving Lemma 6
Lower Bounds
Time-Space Tradeoffs for Sponge Hashing: Attacks and Limitations for Short Collisions
1.1 Detour: The Case of Merkle-Damgård
1.2 Our Results
1.3 Future Directions
1.4 Related Work
2 Technical Overview
2.1 Attacks
2.2 Impossibility Results for Best Attacks
4 Attacks
4.1 Generic Attack for B-Block Collisions
4.2 Preprocessing Attack for B=1.
4.3 Time-Space Tradeoffs for Inverting a Restricted Permutation
5 Impossibility Results
5.1 Advantage Upper Bound for B=1
5.2 Advantage Upper Bound for B=2
On Time-Space Tradeoffs for Bounded-Length Collisions in Merkle-Damgård Hashing *-9pt
1.2 Discussion
2 Our Techniques
4 The Framework: Reducing the Problem to a Multi-instance Collision Finder
5 Proving the STB Conjecture for BO(1)
5.1 The Compression Argument
5.2 Handling Cases [case:newsl]1 to [case:oldsl]4
5.3 Handling Case [case:somerep]5
6 Proving the STB Conjecture for SB T
Time-Space Lower Bounds for Finding Collisions in Merkle-Damgård Hash Functions
1.2 Our Techniques
1.3 Discussions and Open Problems
2.1 Merkle-Damågard Hash Functions (MD)
2.2 Collision-Resistance Against Auxiliary Input (AI)
3 Auxiliary Input Collision Resistance for B=2 Merkle-Damgard
4 Auxiliary Input Collision Resistance for B Merkle-Damgard
4.1 Proof of Claim 7
.26em plus .1em minus .1emSustained Space and Cumulative Complexity Trade-Offs for Data-Dependent Memory-Hard Functions*-10pt
1.2 Dynamic Graphs and Dynamic Pebbling Games
1.3 Trade-Offs for dMHFs
1.4 Technical Overview
2.1 Dynamic Pebbling Notation
2.2 Generalized Hoeffding Inequality
2.3 Useful Graphs and Their Pebbling Complexity
3 A Theoretical MHF with Ideal Trade-Off
3.1 The Construction
3.2 Lowerbounding Costly Edges
3.3 The Trade-Off Between Sustained Space and Cumulative Complexity
4 Dynamic EGS
4.1 Lowerbounds on Getting Unlucky
4.2 The Cost of Getting Unlucky
5 Dynamic DRSample
5.1 Lowerbounds on Getting Unlucky.
5.2 The Cost of Being Unlucky
6 Argon2id
6.1 The Trade-Off and Cumulative Complexity
7 Open Problems
Low Communication Complexity Protocols, Collision Resistant Hash Functions and Secret Key-Agreement Protocols
1.1 Cryptographic Primitives
1.2 Cryptographic Hash Functions
1.3 Adversarially Robust Property-Preserving Hash Functions
1.4 Secret Key Agreement
1.5 Our Results
1.6 Related Work
1.7 Technical Overview
2 Models and Preliminaries
2.1 Model Definition
2.2 Free Talk Model
2.3 Notation
2.4 Probability
2.5 Collision Resistant Hash Functions
2.6 Adversarially Robust Property-Preserving Hash Functions
2.7 Secret Key Agreement and Its Amplification
3 Collision Resistance and the Preset Public Coins Model
3.1 CRHs Imply Succinct Protocols
3.2 Succinct Protocols Imply dCRHs
4 No Ultra Short Interactive Communication
5 Secret Key Agreement from Efficient SM Protocols
5.1 Optimal Protocols from SKA
5.2 SKA from Near Optimal Protocols
6 Conclusions
Cryptanalysis II
Accelerating the Delfs-Galbraith Algorithm with Fast Subfield Root Detection
3 Solver: Optimised Delfs-Galbraith Subfield Searching in X(p, 2)
4 Fast Subfield Root Detection
5 SuperSolver: Optimised Subfield Searching With Fast Subfield Root Detection in X(p, )
6 A Worked Example
7 Implementation Results
Secret Can Be Public: Low-Memory AEAD Mode for High-Order Masking
1.1 Low-Memory AEAD for Masking
1.2 Summary of Contributions
1.3 Related Work
3 Design of AEAD Mode for High-Order Masking
3.1 Intuition and Design of HOMA
3.2 Specification of HOMA
3.3 Protected and Unprotected Values of HOMA
4 Security Claim and Proof of HOMA.
4.1 AE Security for Masking
4.2 AEL-Security of HOMA
4.3 Proof of Theorem 1
5 A TBC Optimized for HOMA
5.1 SKINNY64 and SKINNYe with TK4
5.2 Elastic-Tweak Framework for Small Tweaks
5.3 Design Approach of SKINNYee
5.4 Specifications of SKINNYee
5.5 Design Rationale
5.6 Security Analysis Against Various Cryptanalyses
6 Implementation
6.1 Targets and Design Policy
6.2 Masked S-box Implementation
6.3 Hardware Design
6.4 Performance Evaluation and Comparison
7 Conclusions
Partial Key Exposure Attacks on BIKE, Rainbow and NTRU
2.1 Key Exposure Models
2.2 Decoding
3 BIKE
3.1 Standard Format Keys
3.2 Compact Format Keys
3.3 Practical Attacks on BIKE
4 Rainbow
4.1 Attack Strategy
4.2 Fq-Errors and -Erasures
4.3 Practical Attacks on Rainbow
5 NTRU
5.1 Fq-Errors and -Erasures
5.2 Practical Attacks on NTRU
Improving Support-Minors Rank Attacks: Applications to GeMSS and Rainbow
2.1 Notation
2.2 Relevant Material for the Attack on GeMSS
2.3 Relevant Material on Rainbow for Section8.3
3 Support-Minors Modeling (SM)
4 Improved Attack on GeMSS Using Support-Minors
4.1 Fixing Variables in the Support-Minors System
4.2 Solving via Gröbner Bases when n' 2d+1
5 Complexity of the Attack
5.1 Time Complexity of Step 1
5.2 Time Complexity of Step 2
5.3 Memory Cost
6 Application to GeMSS and pHFEv- Parameter Sets
7 Experiments for Step 1
8 Memory Management Strategy for the Support-Minors Equations Within Block Wiedemann
8.1 Hashing Strategy on the Main Memory
8.2 Memory Savings from Our Approach
8.3 Application to the Rainbow Rectangular MinRank Attack ch13uovspsbeullens
9 Conclusion
Distributed Algorithms.
log*-Round Game-Theoretically-Fair Leader Election.
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ISBN
3-031-15982-9
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