Competition vs. Stability : Oligopolistic Banking System with Run Risk / Damien Capelle.

Author
Capelle, Damien [Browse]
Format
Book
Language
English
Published/​Created
Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2021.
Description
1 online resource (74 pages)

Details

Series
Summary note
This paper develops a model where large financial intermediaries subject to systemic runs internalize the effect of their leverage on aggregate risk, returns and asset prices. Near the steady-state, they restrict leverage to avoid the risk of a run which gives rise to an accelerator effect. For large adverse shocks, the system enters a zone with high leverage and possibly runs. The length of time the system remains in this zone depends on the degree of concentration through a franchise value, price-drop and recapitalization channels. The speed of entry of new banks after a collapse has a stabilizing effect.
Source of description
Description based on print version record.
Doi
  • 10.5089/9781513582313.001
Statement on language in description
Princeton University Library aims to describe library materials in a manner that is respectful to the individuals and communities who create, use, and are represented in the collections we manage. Read more...
Other views
Staff view

Supplementary Information