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Competition vs. Stability : Oligopolistic Banking System with Run Risk / Damien Capelle.
Author
Capelle, Damien
[Browse]
Format
Book
Language
English
Published/Created
Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2021.
Description
1 online resource (74 pages)
Details
Series
IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2021/102
[More in this series]
IMF Working Papers
Summary note
This paper develops a model where large financial intermediaries subject to systemic runs internalize the effect of their leverage on aggregate risk, returns and asset prices. Near the steady-state, they restrict leverage to avoid the risk of a run which gives rise to an accelerator effect. For large adverse shocks, the system enters a zone with high leverage and possibly runs. The length of time the system remains in this zone depends on the degree of concentration through a franchise value, price-drop and recapitalization channels. The speed of entry of new banks after a collapse has a stabilizing effect.
Source of description
Description based on print version record.
Doi
10.5089/9781513582313.001
Statement on language in description
Princeton University Library aims to describe library materials in a manner that is respectful to the individuals and communities who create, use, and are represented in the collections we manage.
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Competition vs. Stability : Oligopolistic Banking System with Run Risk
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99125479229806421