Details

Subject(s)

• Mind and body [Browse]
• Self [Browse]
• Hume, David 1711-1776—Criticism and interpretation [Browse]

Series

• Philosophische Analyse ; Bd. 22. [More in this series]
• Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical analysis ; Bd. 22 [More in this series]

Subseries of

Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis

Summary note

This essay proposes that Hume's non-substantialist bundle account of minds is basically correct. The concept of a person is not a metaphysical notion but a forensic one, that of a being who enters into the moral and normative relations of civil society. A person is a bundle but it is also a structured bundle. Hume's metaphysics of relations is argued must be replaced by a more adequate one such as that of Russell, but beyond that Hume's account is essentially correct. In particular it is argued that it is one's character that constitutes one's identity; and that sympathy and the passions of

Notes

Description based upon print version of record.

Bibliographic references

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Language note

English

Contents

• Frontmatter
• Acknowledgments
• Note
• Table of Contents
• Introduction
• Endnotes to Introduction
• Chapter One: Self as Substance
• Chapter Two: Nominalism and Acquaintance
• Chapter Three: From the Substance Tradition through Locke to Hume: Ordinary Things and Critical Realism
• Chapter Four: The Disappearance of the Simple Self: Its Problems
• Chapter Five: Hume's Positive Account of the Self
• Bibliography
• Index of Names
• Backmatter

Show 11 more Contents items

Other format(s)

Issued also in print.

ISBN

• 3-938793-79-1
• 3-11-032707-4

OCLC

• 851970752
• 1013949438
• 853252218

Doi

10.1515/9783110327076

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