Blockchain Economics / Joseph Abadi, Markus Brunnermeier.

Author
Abadi, Joseph [Browse]
Format
Book
Language
English
Published/​Created
Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2018.
Description
1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Details

Series
  • Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w25407. [More in this series]
  • NBER working paper series no. w25407
Summary note
The fundamental problem in digital record-keeping is to establish consensus on an update to a ledger, e.g., a payment. Consensus must be achieved in the presence of faults--situations in which some computers are offline or fail to function appropriately. Traditional centralized record-keeping systems rely on trust in a single entity to achieve consensus. Blockchains decentralize record-keeping, dispensing with the need for trust in a single entity, but some instead build a consensus based on the wasteful expenditure of computational resources (proof-of-work). An ideal method of consensus would be tolerant to faults, avoid the waste of computational resources, and be capable of implementing all individually rational transfers of value among agents. We prove a Blockchain Trilemma: any method of consensus, be it centralized or decentralized, must give up (i) fault-tolerance, (ii) resource-efficiency, or (iii) full transferability.
Notes
December 2018.
Source of description
Print version record
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