Do Financial Incentives Encourage Welfare Recipients to Work? Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation of the Self-Sufficiency Project / David Card, Philip K. Robins.

Author
Card, David [Browse]
Format
Book
Language
English
Published/​Created
Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1996.
Description
1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Details

Related name
Series
  • Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w5701. [More in this series]
  • NBER working paper series no. w5701
Summary note
This paper reports on a randomized evaluation of an earnings subsidy offered to long-term welfare recipients in Canada. The program -- known as the Self-Sufficiency Project (SSP) -- provides a supplement equal to one-half of the difference between a target earnings level and a participant's actual earnings. The SSP supplement is similar to a negative income tax with two important differences: (1) eligibility is limited to long-term welfare recipients who find a full-time job; and (2) the payment depends on individual earnings rather than family income. Our evaluation is based on a classical randomized design: one half of a group of single parents who had been on welfare for over a year were eligible to receive the SSP supplement, while the other half were assigned to a control group. Results for an early cohort of SSP participants and controls suggest that the financial incentives of the Self-Sufficiency Program increase labor market attachment and reduce welfare participation.
Notes
August 1996.
Source of description
Print version record
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