The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective / William M. Landes, Richard A. Posner.

Author
Landes, William M. [Browse]
Format
Book
Language
English
Published/​Created
  • Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1975.
  • Cambridge, Massachusetts : National Bureau of Economic Research, 1975.
Description
1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Details

Subject(s)
Related name
Series
  • Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w0110. [More in this series]
  • NBER working paper series no. w0110
Summary note
We believe that at a deeper level the independent judiciary is not only consistent with, but essential to, the interest-group theory of government. Part I of this paper explains our theory of the independent judiciary. Part II discusses several implications of the theory, relating to administrative regulation, the form of interest-group legislation, the tenure of judges, and constitutional adjudication. The appendix to this paper presents an empirical analysis of judicial independence using data on Acts of Congress that have been held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
Notes
October 1975.
Source of description
Print version record
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