The 2008 Financial Crisis and the Lack of Retaliatory Trade Intervention / Chunding Li, John Whalley.

Author
Li, Chunding [Browse]
Format
Book
Language
English
Published/​Created
Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2016.
Description
1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Details

Series
  • Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w21853. [More in this series]
  • NBER working paper series no. w21853
Summary note
The 2008 financial crisis did not precipitate global retaliatory trade intervention, in seeming contrast to the Great Depression in 1930s. This paper discusses the influence of model structure in optimal tariff (OT) calculations in explaining this puzzle. We emphasize how earlier literature reports high optimal tariffs in numerical calculation (of a hundred of percent) but only uses simple trade models. We use numerical general equilibrium calibration and simulation methodology to calculate optimal tariffs both with and without retaliation in a series of observationally equivalent models, and explore the influence of model structures on optimal tariff levels. We gradually add more realistic features into basic general equilibrium model, and show sharply decline optimal tariffs, which suggests that trade retaliation incentives effectively disappear with the deepening of globalization in 2008 compared to 1930.
Notes
January 2016.
Source of description
Print version record
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