An Analysis of Fiscal Policy Under Operative and Inoperative Bequest Motives / Andrew B. Abel.

Author
Abel, Andrew B. [Browse]
Format
Book
Language
English
Published/​Created
Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1987.
Description
1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Details

Series
  • Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w2298. [More in this series]
  • NBER working paper series no. w2298
Summary note
This paper presents a general equilibrium model with logarithmic preferences and technology. If the non-negativity constraint on bequests is strictly binding, then the bequest motive is characterized as inoperative. After determining the conditions for operative and inoperative bequest motives, the paper examines the effect of pay- as- you-go social security on the stochastic evolution of the capital stock. If the non-negativity constraint on bequests is strictly binding, then an increase in social security reduces the unconditional long- run expected capital stock. If the social security taxes and benefits are large enough, then the non-negativity constraint ceases to bind, and further increases in social security have no effect. This paper extends previous analyses by examining bequest behavior outside of the steady state and by allowing a non-degenerate cross-sectional distribution in the holding of capital.
Notes
June 1987.
Source of description
Print version record
Statement on responsible collection description
Princeton University Library aims to describe library materials in a manner that is respectful to the individuals and communities who create, use, and are represented in the collections we manage. Read more...
Other views
Staff view

Supplementary Information