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008    230622s2009    mau    fo     000 0 eng d
035    (NBER)w14674
035    (CKB)3240000000013383
035    (EXLCZ)993240000000013383
040    MaCbNBER |beng |cMaCbNBER
084    L13 |2jelc
100 1  Abbring, Jaap H.
245 10 Last-In First-Out Oligopoly Dynamics / |cJaap H. Abbring, Jeffrey R. Campbell.
260    Cambridge, Mass. |bNational Bureau of Economic Research |c2009.
300    1 online resource: |billustrations (black and white);
490 1  NBER working paper series |vno. w14674
588 0  Print version record
520 3  This paper extends the static analysis of oligopoly structure into an infinite-horizon setting with sunk costs and demand uncertainty. The observation that exit rates decline with firm age motivates the assumption of last-in first-out dynamics: An entrant expects to produce no longer than any incumbent. This selects an essentially unique Markov-perfect equilibrium. With mild restrictions on the demand shocks, sequences of thresholds describe firms' equilibrium entry and survival decisions. Bresnahan and Reiss's (1993) empirical analysis of oligopolists' entry and exit assumes that such thresholds govern the evolution of the number of competitors. Our analysis provides an infinite-horizon game-theoretic foundation for that structure.
500    January 2009.
650  7 Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets |2jelc
710 2  National Bureau of Economic Research.
700 1  Campbell, Jeffrey R.
830  0 Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) |vno. w14674.
906    BOOK