Capital Accumulation and Uncertain Lifetimes with Adverse Selection / Andrew B. Abel.

Author
Abel, Andrew B. [Browse]
Format
Book
Language
English
Published/​Created
Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1985.
Description
1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Details

Series
  • Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w1664. [More in this series]
  • NBER working paper series no. w1664
Summary note
This paper examines the implications of adverse selection in the private annuity market for the pricing of private annuities and the consequent effects on constrption and bequest behavior. With privately known heterogeneous mortality probabilities, adverse selection causes the rate of return on private annuities to be less than the actuarially fair rate based on population average mortality. However, a fully funded social security system with compulsory participation can offer an implied rate of return equal to the actuarially fair rate based on population average mortality. Thus, since social security offers a higher rate of return than private annuities, consumers cannot completely offset the effects of social security by transacting in the private annuity market. Using an overlapping generations model with uncertain lifetimes, we demonstrate that the introduction of actuarially fair social security reduces the steady state rate of return on annuities and raises the steady state levels of average bequests and average consumption of the young. The steady state national capital stock rises or falls according to the strength of the bequest motive.
Notes
July 1985.
Source of description
Print version record
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