Details

Subject(s)

• Military assistance, American—El Salvador [Browse]
• Counterinsurgency—United States [Browse]
• Counterinsurgency—El Salvador [Browse]
• United States—Military relations—El Salvador [Browse]
• El Salvador—military relations—United States [Browse]

Related name

• Rand Corporation [Browse]

Series

R (Rand Corporation) [More in this series]

Summary note

This report assesses the political and social dimensions of American counterinsurgency policy in El Salvador. It attempts to explain why low-intensity-conflict doctrine has not produced the desired results and to reassess that doctrine's future utility. The author's appraisal of U.S. involvement in El Salvador leads him to conclude that there is a vast disparity between U.S. objectives and achievements there. For a decade, U.S. policy toward El Salvador tried to synthesize liberal and conservative aims: foster political, social, and economic reform, and provide security to a country whose freedom from communism the United States deemed essential. In attempting to reconcile these objectives, however, the United States pursued a policy that used means unsettling to itself, for ends humiliating to the Salvadorans, and at a cost disproportionate to any conventional conception of the national interest.

Notes

"Prepared for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy."

Tech. report no.

R-4042-USDP

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