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Being no one : the self-model theory of subjectivity / Thomas Metzinger.
Author
Metzinger, Thomas, 1958-
[Browse]
Format
Book
Language
English
Published/Created
Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, ©2003.
©2003
Description
1 online resource (xii, 699 pages)
Availability
Available Online
CogNet Library Books
Details
Subject(s)
Consciousness
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Cognitive neuroscience
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Self psychology
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Summary note
According to Thomas Metzinger, no such things as selves exist in the world: nobody ever had or was a self. All that exists are phenomenal selves, as they appear in conscious experience. The phenomenal self, however, is not a thing but an ongoing process; it is the content of a "transparent self-model." In Being No One, Metzinger, a German philosopher, draws strongly on neuroscientific research to present a representationalist and functional analysis of what a consciously experienced first-person perspective actually is. Building a bridge between the humanities and the empirical sciences of the mind, he develops new conceptual toolkits and metaphors; uses case studies of unusual states of mind such as agnosia, neglect, blindsight, and hallucinations; and offers new sets of multilevel constraints for the concept of consciousness. Metzinger's central question is: How exactly does strong, consciously experienced subjectivity emerge out of objective events in the natural world? His epistemic goal is to determine whether conscious experience, in particular the experience of being someone that results from the emergence of a phenomenal self, can be analyzed on subpersonal levels of description. He also asks if and how our Cartesian intuitions that subjective experiences as such can never be reductively explained are themselves ultimately rooted in the deeper representational structure of our conscious minds.
Notes
"A Bradford book."
Source of description
OCLC-licensed vendor bibliographic record.
Language note
English
ISBN
0-262-27972-X
0-585-45669-0
OCLC
52596567
Statement on language in description
Princeton University Library aims to describe library materials in a manner that is respectful to the individuals and communities who create, use, and are represented in the collections we manage.
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Being no one : the self-model theory of subjectivity / Thomas Metzinger.
id
9942657863506421
Being no one : the self-model theory of subjectivity / Thomas Metzinger.
id
SCSB-4332618