Details

Related name

• Princeton University. Department of Politics [Browse]

Restrictions note

• This item is not available from ProQuest Dissertations & Theses.
• This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
• This item must not be added to any third party search indexes.

Summary note

The returns to delegation by the American president to executive branch subordinates animatesthe study of bureaucratic politics. Scholars of the judiciary labor over whether the ?least dangerousbranch? can be independent when it is wholly reliant on the elected branches for its existence. Thisdissertation faces both concerns by studying the executive branch actors tasked with engaging thefederal courts: presidentially appointed U.S. Attorneys.I ask three related questions, the answers to which illuminate both sides of the executive-judicialrelationship. First, what motivates the President to attempt to influence the judiciary? Second,who does the President select to serve as U.S. Attorney? Finally, can the President actuallyaffect the types of cases filed in federal court through his appointment power? The dissertationoffers compelling evidence that the canonical principal-agent framework, which has provided thetheoretical scaffolding for many studies of the administrative state in the post-war period, alsoexplains the executive branch?s impact on the judiciary.The chief theoretical contribution of this project is the concept of a judicial policy agenda, aset of presidential policy goals which require realization on a case-by-case basis. This notion offersan organizing vocabulary for the actions presidents take to influence judicial outcomes. I analyzedDepartment of Justice records and presidential rhetoric to identify the annual goals of each presidentfrom Richard Nixon to Donald Trump.Empirical demonstration that presidents exercise control over the federal docket through theirappointees is established by synthesizing several sources of data. Data on millions of criminal courtcases filed from 1970 to 2017 are complemented with a novel data set containing the details ofappointment for U.S. Attorneys in the same years.I use a time-series cross-sectional analysis to establish whether changes in government advocatesaffect the types and quantity of cases filed in federal court. The results show that presidentialappointment of U.S. Attorneys has a significant impact on case filings.The questions concerning inter-institutional relationships confronted by this dissertation areboth timeless and topical. My research brings new theory and evidence to bear on questions whichhave consumed academics and observers of democracy for decades.

Notes

• Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-09, Section: A.
• Advisor: Cameron, Charles M.

Dissertation note

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Princeton University, 2020.

In

Dissertations Abstracts International 81-09A

ISBN

9781392769201

OCLC

1257797473

Statement on language in description

Princeton University Library aims to describe library materials in a manner that is respectful to the individuals and communities who create, use, and are represented in the collections we manage. Read more...