Moral knowledge / Sarah McGrath.

Author
McGrath, Sarah [Browse]
Format
Book
Language
English
Εdition
First edition.
Published/​Created
Oxford : Oxford University Press, [2019]
Description
x, 218 pages ; 24 cm

Details

Subject(s)
Summary note
Compared to other kinds of knowledge, how fragile is our knowledge of morality? Does knowledge of the difference between right and wrong fundamentally differ from knowledge of other kinds, in that it cannot be forgotten? What makes reliable evidence in fundamental moral convictions? And what are the associated problems of using testimony as a source of moral knowledge? Sarah McGrath provides novel answers to these questions and many others, as she investigates the possibilities, sources, and characteristic vulnerabilities of moral knowledge. She also considers whether there is anything wrong with simply outsourcing moral questions to a moral expert and evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of the method of equilibrium as an account of how we make up our mind about moral questions. Ultimately, McGrath concludes that moral knowledge can be acquired in any of the ways in which we acquire ordinary empirical knowledge. Our efforts to acquire and preserve such knowledge, she argues, are subject to frustration in all of the same ways that our efforts to acquire and preserve ordinary empirical knowledge are.
Bibliographic references
Includes bibliographical references (pages 201-209) and index.
ISBN
  • 0198805411 (hardcover)
  • 9780198805410 (hardcover)
OCLC
1101788852
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