Details

Related name

• Princeton University. Department of Philosophy [Browse]

Restrictions note

This item is not available from ProQuest Dissertations & Theses.

Summary note

This dissertation examines the nature of scientific exegesis, i.e., the task of determining what science says about the world. I argue that nearly all contemporary theories of scientific exegesis are untenable. My primary argument for this centers around a phenomena that I call 'representational artifacts'. Representational artifacts are, to a first approximation, features of scientific representations that do not directly correspond to elements of the physical world. After exploring the difficulties that such artifacts raise in chapter two, the remaining chapters consider what representational artifacts reveal about the nature of scientific exegesis.

Notes

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-04(E), Section: A.

Dissertation note

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Princeton University, 2017.

In

Dissertation Abstracts International 79-04A(E).

ISBN

9780355322552

OCLC

1029065027

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