Regulatory takings : law, economics, and politics / William A. Fischel.

Author
Fischel, William A. [Browse]
Format
Book
Language
English
Published/​Created
Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1995.
Description
xi, 415 pages ; 24 cm

Availability

Copies in the Library

Location Call Number Status Location Service Notes
Firestone Library - Stacks KF5698 .F573 1995 Browse related items Request

    Details

    Subject(s)
    Summary note
    Regulatory Takings argues that the issue is not so much about the details of property law as it is about the fairness of politics and the capacity of the courts to protect property interests. William Fischel demonstrates that property is often protected by nonjudicial means. Local governments are deterred from unfairly regulating portable assets by their owners' threat of "exit" from the jurisdiction. State and federal government regulations are disciplined by property-owner coalitions whose "voice" is clearly audible in the statehouses and in Congress. Constitutional courts need to preserve their resources for use in areas in which politics is loaded against the property owner. Zoning and rent controls, which often promote the interests of a majority of local residents at the expense of unrepresented outsiders, require closer judicial scrutiny than national laws such as the Endangered Species Act. Regulatory Takings advances an economic standard to decide when a local regulation crosses the line from legitimate police power to a taking that requires just compensation for owners who are adversely affected. Regulatory Takings goes beyond case law and jurisprudential theories to buttress its arguments. It employs economic and political analysis, historical investigations, and statistical studies to make a case for judicial federalism
    Bibliographic references
    Includes bibliographical references (p. 377-406) and index.
    Contents
    • 1. Of Coase and Coal: Regulatory Takings in the U.S. Supreme Court
    • 2. Eminent Domain's Democratic Origins and Economic Cycles
    • 3. Constitutional Law, Process Theory, and Democratic Commitment
    • 4. The Economic-Utilitarian Theories of Michelman and Epstein
    • 5. Rational Expectations and Contractarian Conventions
    • 6. Capitalizing on Land Use Regulation: Evidence from California
    • 7. Zoning, Capitalization, and the Efficiency of Local Government
    • 8. How Exit and Voice Discipline Governmental Excess
    • 9. Remedies for Unfair Land Use Restrictions and Exactions.
    ISBN
    • 0674753887 ((acid-free paper))
    • 9780674753884 ((acid-free paper))
    LCCN
    95001361
    OCLC
    31865559
    Other standard number
    • ZBWT00692005
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