Details

Subject(s)

• Knowledge, Theory of. [Browse]
• Contextualism (Philosophy) [Browse]

Summary note

This book develops and defends a version of epistemic contextualism, that is, of the view that the truth conditions or the meaning of knowledge attributions of the form "S knows that p" can vary with the context of the attributor. The first part of the book is about arguments for contextualism and develops a particular version of it. The second part of the book discusses problems contextualism faces and to which it needs to respond as well as an extension of contextualism beyond epistemology. The third part of the book is about some major objections to contextualism and about alternative views, namely subject-sensitive invariantism, contrastivism, and relativism.

Bibliographic references

Includes bibliographical references (pages 231-255) and index.

Contents

• Part I. Arguments ; The argument from cases : standard contextualism and standards contextualism
• The argument from reliability : the role of reference classes
• The argument from luck : the role of descriptions
• Part II. Problems and extensions ; Skepticism, lotteries, and contextualist solutions
• Cross-context attributions and the knowability problem : does contextualism lead to a contradiction?
• Beyond knowledge : action and responsibility
• Part III. Objections and alternatives ; Objections
• Alternatives?

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Other title(s)

Defense

ISBN

• 9780198754312
• 0198754310

LCCN

2016937254

OCLC

950965080

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